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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENT 
Putin addresses 2005 goals 
Putting behind him a year that brought terror home to Russia's school children in 
Beslan, President Putin chose to focus his New Year's address on Russia's 
social aims for 2005: 
 
"All our priorities are focused on people's intellectual and spiritual development.  
The main task, the principle internal force of Russia's development is to realize 
each person's capabilities and improve the life of the nation."  (1)  When did the 
Russian President become the spiritual adviser/motivational speaker-in-chief? 
 
In fairness, Putin did allude to the Beslan tragedy, I think.  "I have to say that the 
outgoing year also witnessed dramatic events in the life of our nation.  Even 
today, on New Year's night, we must remember this." (2)   I suppose that calling 
attention, in any greater detail, to the fact that the leadership has not managed to 
address any of the security concerns arising from the Beslan hostage crisis, and 
thus Russia's citizens (and their children) have been given no reassurance that it 
won't happen again, is reason enough not to name the "dramatic events" of the 
past year. 
 
Looking forward however, Putin cites his administration's intention to invest in 
education, housing, and health care as priorities for 2005.  He also highlighted 
the coming 60th anniversary of victory in the Great Patriotic War as a "great 
holiday for us."(3)  Ironic, isn't it given the government's first moves of 2005 – 
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monetizing benefits in a "reform" that sends veterans and pensioners out onto 
the streets in protest. 
 
Economic realism and its discontents 
In an address to the government in mid-January, President Putin made his case 
for changes to the social benefits sector of the economy, presenting a solid, 
albeit brief, history on the realities of the state's social entitlements in both the 
Soviet and post-Soviet past: 
 
"A system of benefits existed in the Soviet Union and worked effectively overall 
for that time and within that system.  At the same time, I think we all recall very 
well that only a relatively small overall share of the Soviet population was entitled 
to these benefits." (4)  Lest one wonder who Putin considered the main 
beneficiaries of Soviet largesse:  "For the most part, this included veterans and 
disabled people, that is to say, people who took part in the Great Patriotic 
WarŠonly a relatively small share of the Soviet Union's population." (5)  I guess 
the anniversary celebrations of the WWII victory won't include an increase in 
veteran's pensions.  
 
As for post-Soviet Russia, Putin accurately identifies the progress of the 
rhetorical benefits balloon:  "Economic and social problems began emerging 
following the breakup of the Soviet Union.  We all know the scale these problems 
took.  Unfortunately, at the very moment the country began facing these 
problems, decisions were taken to increase the number of various benefits. (Š) 
[T]he government should have been prepared today for criticism from parties on 
both the right and left, because it was precisely these parties that, at that time, on 
the one hand created the oligarchic system of capitalism in Russia and let the 
country's national wealth be pillaged, and , on the other hand, took or 
encouraged the adoption of these decisions that were popular but completely 
unable to be fulfilled." (6)  Putin goes on to note that under the laws written at the 
time, "more than half of the total Russian population was entitled to benefits." (7) 
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Reserving the right to dispute his account of the facts on the enlargement of 
entitlements, wouldn't that scenario fall into the category of inexperienced 
politicians emulating the appearance of political horse-trading practiced by 
"mature" democracies?  The first post-Soviet waves of politicians over-promised 
their electorates in order to get elected, then over-legislated (slathering pork into 
the budget), and then left the economic deficits to the next waves of politicians.  
A sound, tightly regulated economic policy might have been able to lessen the 
impact of this experience, but the hurly-burly of economic transition during the 
Yel'tsin regime (and the West's insistence that economic transition should 
"trump" political reform) allowed gross incompetence to rule in various political 
and economic sectors.  Putin, and his staff, clearly have managed to identify a 
major problem, both with the early transition years and the current situation, but 
his solution is what remains perplexing.  
 
Will grey be the next revolution? 
The decision to monetize state benefits may be backed by reasonable fiscal 
arguments, but the clear losers in this state reform were going to be Russia's 
veterans, disabled and pensioners.  Their presence on the streets (see 
"Domestic Issues" for more on the grey revolution), and their protests, were 
easily foreseeable.  Why then, did Putin emphasize the anniversary of the Great 
Patriotic War and the veterans during his New Year's speech?  Perhaps to 
acknowledge their suffering and hard-work before asking for more sacrifice from 
them?  Perhaps in the hopes that his rhetoric would mask the realities of his 
reforms?  Whatever his intentions, it is obvious, once again, that Russia's 
transition from Soviet/authoritarian rule will require yet more sacrifice from its 
older population – veterans, disabled, vulnerable.  Perhaps this time the regime 
will be willing to provide a stronger safety net.  It would seem to be the least they 
could do. 
 
Political and economic reform collide 
 4 
With the appearance of protestors on the street, Sergei Mitrokhin, Deputy Chair 
of Yabloko, made a rather coherent argument against increased central control of 
the regions.   Mitrokhin used the President's December press conference, during 
which the prospect of the Kremlin's appointment of Russia's mayors was raised, 
as a jumping off point to discuss the relative benefits of strict central control over 
regional governments.  Mitrokhin suggests that modernization, particularly state-
controlled authoritarian modernization, benefits from local government, which 
"relieves the state bureaucracy of the intolerable burden of local concernsŠ." (8) 
 
Putin's decision to appoint regional governors, and perhaps even city mayors, 
would be particularly ill-prepared to handle popular protests like that of the 
pensioners, who, at least for now, direct their anger at local leaders whom they 
have elected directly.  (9)  Absent those local elections and their handy regional 
political elites, public protest would have only the central authorities as their 
focus.  Food for thought Vladimir Vladimirovich. 
 
Did he really say that? 
The first award in the "chutzpah" category for 2005 has to go, once again, to 
Anatoli Chubais.  Chubais was quite vocal in his criticism of Prime Minister 
Fradkov's government at a meeting with top government and business authorities 
at the Council on Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship's first meeting of the 
year.  Chubais complained to Fradkov that, "There has not been such a difficult 
situation for 15 years."  (10)  Among the targets of Chubais' ire, was the state's 
tax policy.  Noting that nearly one third of the businessmen present had trouble 
with tax authorities, Chubais complained, "A remarkable Tax Code  approved 
earlier turned out quite the opposite in reality." (11) 
 
Let's rewind to 1996:  Who was it that named the then newly-created tax police 
the "VChK" in a threatening nod to the Soviet secret police?  Wasn't that Chubais 
who claimed that business had to be strong-armed into paying taxes?  Come to 
think of it, wasn't it Chubais, who, upon ascending to power in the wake of 
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Yel'tsin's colossal fatigue/heart bypass/pneumonia, set himself the task of 
reasserting the "power vertical"?  What was the quote he was fond of then?  Ah 
yes:  "To establish democracy in society requires a dictatorship within the state."  
(12)  
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) "A New Year address to citizens of Russia," President Vladimir Putin, 31 Dec 
04 via (www.kremlin.ru/speeches). 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) "Speech at a Meeting with the Government," President Vladimir Putin, 17 Jan 
05 via (www.kremlin.ru/speeches). 
(5) Ibid. 
(6) Ibid. 
(7) Ibid. 
(8) "A Presidential Envoy in Every Building," Novaya gazeta, 20 Jan 05 via 
JRL#9026, 20 Jan 05. 
(9) Ibid. 
(10) "Chubais Blasts State for Climate of Fear," Guy Faulconbridge in Moscow 
Times, 24 Jan 05 via JRL #9031, 24 Jan 05. 
(11) RIA Novosti, 20 Jan 05 via JRL #9031. 
(12) Christian Science Monitor, 1 Nov 96 via Lexis-Nexis. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Eric Beene 
 
Beslan fallout continues 
As Russia embarks on a new year, it appears the events of the past year still 
haunt the nation at large and the security services in particular.  Specifically, the 
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hostage-taking event at Beslan last September still makes news in January.  Not 
only did the U.S. television network CBS recently air new footage of Ruslan 
Aushev negotiating with the hostage-takers during the siege, but relatives of 
some of the victims blocked the major road into Beslan for three days, protesting 
the fact that those they hold accountable for the attack, including the North 
Ossetian President Alexander Dzasokhov, have not themselves been held at all 
accountable.  The protestors agreed to open the road when promised an 
audience with Putin¹s envoy to the North Caucasus' Dimitri Kozak. (1)  This, 
however, is unlikely to provide the closure the Beslan victims¹ families seek, and 
it is likely instead to renew the focus on the special services and their failings in 
the battle against terrorists. 
 
Perhaps some closure will be found in a report on the Beslan siege being 
prepared by parliamentary commission, and due to be released in the spring.  As 
reported in Rossiyskaya gazeta (a government run newspaper), ³[o]ne of the 
commission's conclusions, which is already well known, is that the law 
enforcement agencies were unable to set up coordinated actions in an 
emergency situation.² (2) Parliamentarians hope to publish some necessary 
recommendations, and they also believe that, following the report¹s release, 
³there should be a series of dismissals of high-ranking Œsiloviki.¹"  As important 
as the MPs seem to believe their findings will be, bereaved Beslan  residents still 
feel this committee¹s investigation is dragging on unnecessarily, perhaps to 
protect high-ranking but culpable authorities.  No doubt such concerns prompted 
this report on the commission¹s progress in the government daily publication.  
Such concerns also appear to have prompted Federation Council member Erik 
Bugulov, the only representative from North Ossetia on the commission, to speak 
out in support of the commission¹s work.  He did mention that leaders from the 
Federal Security Service (FSB), the Interior Ministry (MVD), and the Federal 
Prosecutor¹s Office have participated in the commission¹s fact-finding sessions, 
and he also noted that ³it is very important that the commission name those to 
blame for the Beslan tragedy.²  He also made the point that the terrorists who 
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participated in this event (and were not killed in the shootout) should not be tried 
in their home republics as strong clan and family ties in the regions can hinder 
the pursuit of justice. (2) All of these comments seemed focused on calming the 
concerns of the living victims of the Beslan siege and ensuring that the security 
services, which have been the target of much criticism but little reform since 
Beslan, will be held accountable.  Not mentioned, however, was the impact of the 
operational reforms to the security services approved last fall, giving the FSB the 
primary role in responding to terrorist incidents. 
 
Perhaps by way of response, three days after the story on the Beslan 
commission appeared, the head of the FSB directorate in Dagestan, Nikolai 
Gryaznov, announced publicly that his forces had just prevented a Beslan-like 
siege.  ³ŒThe gunmen who were killed in Kaspiysk and Makhachkala today had 
been preparing a major terrorist act, similar to the one in Beslan,¹ Gryaznov 
said.² (3)  Following public warnings in early January from the FSB and MVD 
about possible terrorist attacks in Russia, security services intensified 
unspecified counter-terrorist measures in most North Caucasus republics.  
Evidently, these measures turned up information on the Jennet group, which 
³had been hunting down staffers of the Dagestani MVD anti-terrorist department: 
In two years 29 policemen had died at the hands of group members.² (5)  Up to 
50 members of the group, led by well-known terrorist Rasul Makasharipov, had 
planned to seize two schools, one in Makhachkala, the other in Kaspiysk.  
Security service agents reportedly blockaded five of the terrorists inside a house 
that had been turned into an arms storage facility for the group, but these five 
escaped, fleeing into a private home in Makhachkala.  (6) 
 
A 15-hour stand-off followed between the holed-up terrorists and members of the 
MVD and FSB, including members of the FSB¹s elite Alfa unit.  The terrorists 
fired on agents from the house, despite reported attempts to negotiate.  
Government forces responded by torching the house with a flame thrower, then 
rolling a tank over the building.  By the end of the stand-off, all five holed-up 
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gunmen were killed, one reportedly wearing a suicide-bomber¹s explosive belt 
and another reported to be Makasharipov himself (although further identification 
is required); three policemen and one officer from the Alfa unit were killed; 
neighboring buildings were destroyed or damaged, and several families lost their 
homes.  (7)  Many members of the Jennet group remain at large, however. (8) 
 
Government representatives were quick to label this operation a success against 
terrorism in Russia, but many others were not so convinced.  The claim that 
government forces prevented a ³Beslan-like² tragedy seems convenient given the 
renewed interest in the September event, but even allowing for that possibility, 
the cost in property and lives, coupled with the tactics used, do not indicate any 
significant improvement in counter-terrorist operations compared with previous 
such operations.  A 15-hour siege by government forces who were forced to use 
a flame thrower and a tank to bring a mere five gunmen to justice seems 
excessive, especially considering the five gunmen escaped from the original 
location. (9) 
 
However, there may be reasons for optimism in the Kremlin—intelligence-
gathering does appear to have prevented some sort of event, although the 
methods used were not specifically described.  Also, even though an unspecified 
but clearly significantly large force, comprised of members of multiple 
organizations (FSB, including the Alfa unit, MVD, and local police at a minimum) 
took 15 hours to subdue five gunmen, there were no reported collateral (civilian) 
deaths, and the fact that a flame thrower and a tank were available in a relatively 
short amount of time indicates some elements of command and control worked 
with some degree of success.  No details were reported on who precisely was in 
charge on the scene and whether that person had the necessary authority, to act 
(in keeping with changes in counter-terrorism response procedures that were 
approved by the Duma last fall). (10)  This event, the way it was handled, and, 
particularly, the reports of it that followed in many media sources do seem to 
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represent improvements in the government¹s counter-terrorism response 
program, even if only in its public relations capability. 
 
Finally, two follow-up items from the last edition of NIS Observed are in order.  
First, the last article discussed the current leadership of the FSB and highlighted 
FSB senior deputy Lieutenant-General Sergei Smirnov as a likely replacement 
for Colonel-General Nikolai Patrushev, who took over the post when previous 
leader, Vladimir Putin, was appointed Russia¹s Prime Minister.  More recently, ³a 
reliable source at the St. Petersburg branch of the FSB² claims that among still 
more upcoming changes in the FSB, Colonel-General Viktor Cherkesov, formerly 
the Presidential Envoy in the North-Western Federal District and currently the 
head of Federal Narcotics Control Service, is the likely candidate to succeed 
Patrushev. (11)  Clearly Cherkesov has the credentials—he entered the KGB in 
1975, as did Putin, and spent much of his service in St. Petersburg/Leningrad.  
(12)  The source also suggested Patrushev will be reappointed as deputy prime 
minister for security services. 
 
While this article highlights a potential candidate to succeed Patrushev, the more 
interesting point is the fact that change in such a significant leadership position is 
being discussed so openly in the Russian press.  This fact alone signifies that 
more changes are likely soon, possibly as part of a major shuffle following (or 
even pre-empting) the release of the parliamentary commission¹s report on the 
Beslan siege.  The fact that multiple names have been mentioned probably 
means we are witnessing an informal vetting process, during which the relative 
popularity (or unpopularity) of each candidate within political party leadership will 
be gauged.  It is probably too early to say which is the front-runner for the job, but 
we are likely to know soon if either of these candidates is politically 
unacceptable, or if there are other possible candidates for the post. 
 
Finally, the previous edition described the Federal Border Guard Service (BGS) 
as having been resubordinated from the MVD to the FSB.  In fact, the BGS was 
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never subordinate to the MVD; prior to the 2003 security service reform, the BGS 
was directly under the control of the Russian president, although it did maintain 
ties with both agencies.  My thanks to M. Hackard for bringing this to my 
attention. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) ³48 Hours,² CBS News, 21 Jan 05, available online at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/01/20/48hours/main668127.shtml and 
³Beslan Parents Lift Road Blockade,² BBC News, 23 Jan 05 available online at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4199691.stm via Johnson¹s Russia List # 
9030, 23 Jan 05. 
(2) Vladimirov, Dmitri, "Parliamentarians Conduct Investigation; Beslan 
Commission Will Most Likely Recommend Dismissal of Number of High-Ranking 
Siloviki," Rossiyskaya gazeta, 12 Jan 05; FBIS-SOV-2005-0112 via World News 
Connection. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) ³Security Official Says 'Beslan-Like Terrorist Act' Prevented In Southern 
Russia,² Interfax, 15 Jan 05, FBIS-SOV-2005-0119 via World News Connection. 
(5) Getmanskiy, Konstantin, "Special Services Warn of Further Terrorist Acts and 
Try To Avert Them," Izvestiya, 18 Jan 05, FBIS-SOV-2005-0119, and Timofey 
Borisov, "Bandits Planned 'Second Beslan.' Results of Special Operation Being 
Assessed in Dagestan," Rossiyskaya gazeta, 18 Jan 05; FBIS-SOV-2005-0119 
via World News Connection. 
(6) Ibid 
(7) Borisov, Ibid. 
(8) Safronov, Yuri, ³Russia's FSB Says Several Jennet Gang Members Still At 
Large,² ITAR-Tass, 18 Jan 05; FBIS-SOV-2005-0119 via World News 
Connection. 
(9) Borisov and "Beslan Game," Gazeta.ru, 19 Jan 05; FBIS-SOV-2005-0119 via 
World News Connection. 
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(10) The NIS Observed: An Analytical Review, Volume IX, Number 19, 10 Dec 
04. 
(11) Maksimov, Vladlev and Sergei Tkachuck, ³Who Will Head The FSB?² Novye 
izvestia, 17 Jan 05, pp. 1-2, from WPS:  Defense and Security via Lexis-Nexis. 
(12) Bennett, Gordon, Vladimir Putin & Russia¹s Special Services, Conflict 
Studies Research Centre, August 2002, p. 9. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Rebecca Mulder 
 
A multi-directional policy for the New Year 
In a recent international press conference, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei 
Viktorovich Lavrov described the past year as difficult for Russia, but, on the 
whole, productive. Outlining the goals of Russian foreign policy, past and 
present, Lavrov summarily stated, ³We have sought to relate our foreign policy as 
closely as possible to the solution of the issues of the social and economic 
development of Russia and to bring everything we do in the world arena closer to 
the interests and needs of our people.² (1) He described Russian foreign policy 
as being ³multi-directional² with a line ³based on pragmatism and on ensuring 
national interests, above all, the country¹s security,² as well as relying on ³real 
opportunities of Russia, the interests of Russia and reciprocal interests of our 
partners in practically all the regions of the world.² (2) He believes that a majority 
of countries want to see Russia play an integral role in international affairs in 
spite of his assertion that certain other countries ³regard Russia with suspicion 
and are even calling for almost a confrontation with Russia.² (3) However, Lavrov 
affirmed that the principles of Russian foreign policy will remain unchanged and 
unprovoked, with adherence to these principles executed ³firmly and consistently, 
in a constructive and responsible manner.² (4) It is from this platform that Lavrov 
plans to approach coming events, such as the Russian-American summit in 
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Bratislava, Slovakia, the European Union-Russia summit, the G-8 summit, as 
well as the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the victory over fascism. 
 
Russia and the West 
Lavrov expressed hope that Russia and the E.U. will be able to implement the 
accords reached during the summit meeting in the Hague last November. 
Echoing remarks made by the Dutch Prime Minister, Lavrov agreed that the E.U. 
and Russia can unite in plans for the near future, with hope that work will be 
completed before the next summit meeting on 10 May in Moscow, which is also 
an occasion for long-awaited border treaties with Latvia and Estonia to be 
signed. Lavrov drew an analogy, using the Russia-NATO framework, to suggest 
that cooperation with the E.U. should follow the same ³no bloc² fashion, with the 
aim of ³singling out common problems where all countries are interested in 
interaction.² (5) He reiterated the Russian concern that it work with the E.U. as an 
equal partner, not one that is simply invited to go along with initiatives that E.U. 
members first decide upon among themselves. Concerning Russian-U.S. 
relations, Lavrov cited the two countries¹ cooperation in the fight against 
terrorism, participation in the initiative related on the nonproliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction, a developing dialogue in the strategic stability sphere and 
further plans to ensure security and promote economic and other bilateral 
interactions. Last month, President Putin himself stated that the U.S. and Russia 
are not only partners but allies in the fight against terrorism, bearing special 
responsibility for arms control in the world. (6) The upcoming Bratislava summit 
will be a forum for President Putin and President Bush to discuss the progress of 
agreements previously reached and international issues like drug trafficking and 
organized crime. Lavrov also expects that the two leaders will exchange opinions 
regarding regional conflicts in various parts of the world; Lavrov stated, in 
response to the newly-confirmed U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice¹s 
stated intentions to pay more attention to the internal political situation in Russia, 
particularly human rights, ³of course, our internal political situation is our internal 
concern.² (7)  
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Lavrov firmly rejected parallels to the Cold War or assertions that Russian-U.S. 
relations have ³cooled² under the leadership of Putin and Bush.  Declaring the 
two men to have ³relations of mutual respect,² Lavrov also stated, ³Even in the 
hardest times when the Cold War started after World War II, we did not regard 
the United States as an enemy. There was such a term—potential enemy. But 
this was due to the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union had huge 
missile potentials. Still, I do not think that the bulk of Russians see the United 
States as an enemy.² (8) 
 
Sergei Karaganov, political expert on Moscow-Washington relations, believes 
that relations between Russia and the U.S. will be ³somewhat cool due to the 
U.S. administration¹s mounting criticisms of the change in Russia¹s domestic 
policy² and foresees a persistent rivalry between the two countries throughout the 
former Soviet republics: ³Such rivalry has to be taken in stride; it is simply 
unavoidable in the current situation. This game will be won by he who pursues 
more skillful policies and becomes more attractive to the countries in the region.² 
(9) Karaganov, like Lavrov, sees the Bratislava summit as a way to underline 
differences and reconfirm areas of political cooperation, especially ways to 
improve bilateral relations following the Ukrainian election. 
 
Other Russian and U.S. political scientists have determined it ³necessary to 
institutionalize the communication channel between the U.S. Security Council 
[sic] and the Russian Security Council, which has become of late the main 
instrument in cooperation on an operational level.² (10) They also proposed the 
revival of the 'group of strategic stability,' the creation of a Joint Intelligence 
Committee, and the institution of a civil forum that would deal with cooperation 
between non-governmental organizations, all of which would aid in cooperation 
between the two countries. 
 
Ukraine 
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In response to the recent election disputes, Lavrov stressed that President Putin 
respects the choice of the Ukrainian people and that Russia will approach the 
development of relations with President Viktor Yushchenko and the Ukrainian 
people as a ³partner² in a ³neighborly, friendly manner² stating that ³relations 
between our two countries are immeasurably deeper and broader than the 
situation that prevailed during the prolonged election campaign.² (11) Some 
Russian political analysts have had a measured response to the election 
outcome, as opposed to hawkish commentators who accused the West of 
carrying out sinister operations to get desired results. The moderate analysts 
contend that Western influence is a modern, effective form of projecting more 
ideological, soft power in the region and that Moscow simply needs to learn a 
lesson and rethink its tactics concerning Western competition in the CIS.  (12) 
Whether Moscow will respond with a similar ideological initiative or use strong-
arm tactics remains to be seen. 
 
Georgia and the OSCE 
Foreign Minister Lavrov has planned a visit to Georgia on 18 February that is 
meant to help jump-start negotiations on a bilateral agreement that had recently 
stalled. Russia has suggested the creation of "anti-terror centers" using existing 
Russian military bases as infrastructure. (13) Prolonging the flurry of accusations 
by Russia that Georgia backs terrorists and allows them to reside in the Pankisi 
Gorge, particularly following the abandonment of border-monitoring by the 
OSCE, Lavrov stated that Russia is prepared to control the border on the 
Russian side using Russian border guards and this should not be seen as 
³political sabotage² given that ³our OSCE colleagues admit, at least privately, that 
the mission is no longer needed and is not worth spending the money on.² (14) 
Regarding terrorism, Lavrov said that he has seen increased cooperation 
between the border and law-enforcement services of both Russia and Georgia, 
which have produced positive results, but that problems remain and the two 
states need to unite ³to prevent terrorists from using the Pankisi Gorge as a 
staging post and as a rest area, etc.² (15) Lavrov admitted that the quick phase 
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out of the OSCE¹s Border Monitoring Operation was Russia¹s initiative; until now, 
the BMO had rejected, implicitly or explicitly, Moscow¹s allegations that there 
were ³terrorists² in Georgia and ha found itself functioning as a political deterrent 
to possible Russian military action in the area (under the guise of anti-terrorism). 
 
Syria and the Middle East 
Russia has declared Syria to be one its most important partners in the Middle 
East. According to Lavrov, ³Russia, like Syria, is coming out consistently for a 
comprehensive approach to Middle East settlement so that its various aspects 
are not ignored because a solution can only be comprehensive.² (16) Bilateral 
cooperation in the spheres of trade and economics are valued by both countries 
and Lavrov expressed enthusiasm in the upcoming visit to Moscow by the Syrian 
president. Russia believes that Syria is a key state in the settlement of the Middle 
East situation, which covers not only Palestinian-Israeli relations, but also Syrian-
Israeli and Lebanese-Israeli relations. Lavrov denied recent reports that Moscow 
is planning to sell missiles to Syria, as did Russian Defense Minister Sergei 
Ivanov. Lavrov stated, ³We have never supplied weapons that are either banned 
under our international commitments or weapons that would in certain quantities 
destabilize the situation in conflict regions.² (17) [For more on the putative 
Russian-Syrian arms deal, see "Armed Forces: External" below.] 
 
Iraq 
Concerning Iraq, Lavrov expressed the need for elections to occur in order to 
allow a starting process in the restoration of Iraqi sovereignty. If elections are 
held, he said, it is important for the Iraqi people and not outsiders, to determine 
the legitimacy of those elections. He then offered Russian assistance in 
assessing their legitimacy, if so requested. 
 
Iran 
Lavrov again affirmed that Russia is engaged with Iran in the energy sphere and 
other forms of economic cooperation; The construction of the Bushehr reactor 
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lies within the sphere of nuclear energy cooperation, one that Lavrov says is 
³fully transparent and under IAEA control.² (18) Russia has maintained close 
contacts with the Iranian leadership and European partners in helping to develop 
cooperation with Iran, especially regarding nuclear activity. However, Lavrov 
made it clear that ³we [Russia] will not tolerate attempts to use developments 
around the Iranian nuclear program in order to undermine Russia¹s position in 
the Iranian energy market by non-market and wrongful methods. We have no 
grounds for fearing such attempts.² (19) 
 
A strong Russia 
As Russian foreign policy enters another year, Russia continues to position itself 
in a manner that will give the country the most influence possible given its 
relative strengths and weaknesses. Internal reforms and Putin's consolidation of 
power have caused many in the West and elsewhere to believe that Russia is 
moving towards a highly authoritarian form of government, one that threatens 
democracy internally and in its near abroad. This image does not appear to 
concern Lavrov who stated, ³Reforms are conducted in order to strengthen our 
country and to answer the challenges that we are tangibly aware of to the unity of 
our country and to its place in the worldŠThe world needs a strong Russia 
because it is in everybody¹s interestsŠand if those who understand this and see 
these reforms as being positive for our country and for the destinies of the world, 
then we believe that their assessment is correct.²  (20) To all those who see a 
strong Russia as not being in the world¹s best interest, Lavrov declared, ³this is 
not our problem.² (21)  
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Federal News Service (www.fednews.ru/) via Johnson¹s Russia List (JRL) , 
19 Jan 2005, #2-JRL9028; (www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/9028-2.cfm). 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) Ibid. 
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(4) Ibid. 
(5) Ibid. 
(6) Interfax via CDI Russia Weekly, 24 Dec 2004, #3-RW 12-24-05; 
(www.cdi.org/Russia/336-3.cfm). 
(7) Ibid; Federal News Service via JRL, #2-JRL9028, 19 Jan 05. 
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Gray alienation 
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The first spontaneous protests of Putin¹s regime started this month in Saint 
Petersburg, and have lead already to concessions in the newly implemented 
policy that monetized pensions. The so-called ³Gray Revolution² taking place 
among Russia¹s pensioners is not so much a revolution as it is a reflection of the 
growing distance of the elderly population from Putin. The protesters blocking the 
streets of Saint Petersburg and other cities bring to light some interesting 
developments in Russian political affairs, not least of which is Putin¹s unthinking 
willingness to alienate a segment of the population that had provided some of his 
most constant support. 
 
The majority of government representatives responding to this self-induced crisis 
are regional and local officials. Putin¹s governmental restructuring following 
Beslan sought to replace the current system of elections with a new system that 
essentially reduces the role of governors and regional leaders to that of 
presidential appointees. (The appointments will receive the Duma¹s rubber stamp 
in order to keep things official.) The revival of centrally-appointed regional 
leaders suggests a return to a familiar type of hierarchical (or vertical) leadership, 
which fosters the alienation of the population from their local authorities. Officials 
selected by the center are more likely to cater to the interests of those who 
appointed them rather than to the needs of the population they were appointed to 
serve. Putin's regional "reforms" are more likely to exacerbate the gray alienation 
and other examples of social unrest rather than deflect or absorb discontent. The 
street protests of Russia's elderly pensioners illustrates the necessity of having 
local officials with the power and motivation to assess, monitor, and defuse crises 
as they develop rather than defer to the center (which then becomes the focus of 
protest). Some local officials, including the mayors of several cities, diluted the 
proposed benefits "reforms" and quelled opposition by allowing pensioners to 
continue to receive free public transportation (the primary complaint of the 
protesters). These elected local leaders may have responded out of a sense of 
obligation to constituents and neighbors. Putin's "reforms" will destroy that 
element of political motivation and compound pressure on the central authorities.  
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While the regional and local leaders worked to contain the crises in their streets, 
Putin was silent. Some critics have posited that the demonstrations of the 
pensioners highlight the notion that Putin is increasingly out of touch with reality. 
If nothing else, the fact that the central government's monetization of pensions 
did not even provide enough money to cover the cost of the transportation 
privileges lost by pensioners may confirm this view. 
 
The pensioners of Saint Petersburg have had an especially difficult time in the 
last month. In December, because of the government¹s eagerness to make a 
smooth transition to the newly monetized system, many pensioners failed to 
receive their regular checks. In effect, operations stopped in late December while 
the government prepared for the switch to monetized benefits, leaving many 
pensioners without an income. (1) One can only assume that this fueled their 
frustration, especially once the newly adjusted checks were distributed and found 
seriously lacking. 
 
The ³Power² of the press 
The protests raise several issues about the ³power² of the press in Russia. In a 
brief search for articles related to pensions in the last year, the results showed 
that many of the articles, at least in the last three months, reported that pensions 
were set to increase in 2005. While this is true (pensions are scheduled to 
increase to account for inflation at periodic intervals throughout the year and 
include increases to cover part of the benefits that were scheduled to be 
revoked), references to monetization were matter-of-fact and very poorly 
detailed. The lack of spontaneous protest before the checks were sent out – 
even though monetization was mentioned in the media – allows several possible 
interpretations. 
 
First, the favorable headlines concerning pension increases failed to mention the 
potential drawbacks of monetization, so pensioners did not realize that it could 
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affect them adversely. The self-imposed censorship of the Russian press did not 
lend itself to a watchdog function in the interest of the people. In this case, the 
willingness of the media to paint Putin¹s actions in favorable colors masked the 
effects of his policies. 
 
A second option is that pensioners knew about the prospects of monetization, but 
decided to adopt a ³wait and see² attitude, given the central authorities track 
record with implementing reforms. 
 
Third, pensioners may not have realized fully what was happening until their 
pension checks arrived, or until they were denied free access to public transit. 
This scenario seriously devalues the power of the press, assuming that it played 
virtually no role in providing information to Russian citizens about issues that 
have a direct effect on their lives. 
 
It now appears that pensioners were aware of the coming monetization – 
pensioners in Saint Petersburg were looking forward to receiving extra cash (2)  
– but failed to realize the implications of losing some benefits they had taken for 
granted, such as free public transportation. This indicates a lapse in the 
informative function of the media in addressing issues that have a major impact 
on the lives of their readers and viewers. 
 
In the west, the power of the press is something that is constantly debated in a 
variety of venues. Here, the conclusion is that the media does have, at the very 
least, an informative role and, at the opposite extreme, the power to influence 
elections, policy, etc. by the nature of their coverage and the topics they choose 
to include in their publications and broadcasts. In the West, the media is 
considered an essential component of democracy, another check or balance to 
the actions of the government, one which provides public accountability. 
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Admittedly, Russia does not have the strong democratic tradition of its western 
counterparts, but the public¹s response to the press, as seen through the riots of 
the pensioners, is revealing. Even when the press covers an issue, such as 
monetization or the reduction of pensioners¹ benefits, a response from the public 
awaits proof, in this case, pensioners waited to see their checks. In an ideal 
democracy, citizens participate in the political process not only by voting, but by 
writing to their elected officials, forming organizations to make sure their voices 
are heard, or contributing to the public debate of an issue, perhaps through 
media sources. This does not seem to be happening in Russia, but perhaps the 
pensioners will mark the beginning of an era of civic participation. 
 
The media¹s reluctance to criticize Putin creates a lack of awareness about 
thorny issues on which, theoretically, an average citizen could have an impact. 
An alternate or contingent explanation holds that individuals are aware of the 
issues but, for reasons of apathy, hesitancy, powerlessness, or pessimism, they 
fail to become engaged. The role of the citizen in the Russian political process 
thus far seems to have been one of passive acceptance. The protests over 
monetization reveal a potential shift in the role of at least a portion of the Russian 
population. This time, rather than passively accepting the government¹s actions, 
pensioners are reacting. It is not active involvement in the sense of attempting to 
influence legislation and decrees before they are passed or handed down, but it 
does demonstrate an unwillingness to simply tolerate government decisions.  
Russians may not be starting an orange revolution, but at least this time, with the 
gray-haired and aged to lead the way, they are reacting. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) ³Computer faults leave pensioners penniless, fuming in Russia's St 
Petersburg,² BBC Monitoring, 30 Dec 04 via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(2) Ibid. 
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Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Jeff Kubiak and Kyle Colton 
 
INTERNAL 
A quick look back at 2004 
Observers of the Russian military must be impressed with what Defense Minister, 
Sergei Ivanov, has been able to accomplish.  The Russian Federation armed 
forces are still in crisis, but the landscape has changed dramatically over the past 
12 months.  The single biggest change is the complete domination of the 
Defense Ministry by the ³outside² forces led and directed by Ivanov.  Historical 
³reform² in the defense ministry has resulted in the emasculation of high powered 
armed forces generals and their replacement with former Ivanov colleagues from 
the FSB.  This transition included the eviction of Ivanov¹s primary adversary, 
former Chief of the General Staff, General Kvashnin, and several of his cronies, 
most notably General Kormiltsev, former Commander of the Ground Forces and 
just last month, Col-General Skorodumov, the former head of the Armed Forces 
Main Combat Training Directorate. (1)  The once-powerful General Staff was also 
largely cut out of the military power structure, having been relegated by reform 
legislation to ³think tank² status.  In its place is a 10,000-person strong central 
apparatus staff that reports directly to Ivanov.  Finally, Ivanov has succeeded in 
the consolidation of numerous other functions under the direction of the Defense 
Ministry, including the Railroad Troops, the Special Construction Troops, 
technical cooperation and weapons export control, as well as portions of the 
Federal Agency for Atomic Energy. (2)  
 
The road ahead 
With power centralized within the Defense Ministry, Ivanov and his crowd should 
be more effective in completing those tasks that are essential to rebuilding the 
Russian armed forces.  How does one go about fixing all that is wrong in the 
Russian military given that, although defense budgets are on the rise, the funding 
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is finite and inadequate to the task?  Ivanov outlined his priorities for 2005 this 
way:  ³Organizing closer coordination between all components of national 
defense, maintaining nuclear forces as a level that ensures guaranteed 
deterrence of the aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies, 
increasing the combat potential and improving the state of general-purpose 
troops, first of all, formations and units of permanent readiness.² (3)  The top 
priority, making better use of current capabilities through better coordination, is 
an ongoing restructuring exercise that picked up momentum in the wake of the 
Beslan tragedy.  Modernization of the nuclear forces continues, although at a 
rate slower than the current inventory reaches retirement.  The qualitative 
improvement in the weapons being deployed, however, should go a long way in 
allowing Russia to maintain a viable nuclear deterrent without fear of generating 
a renewed ³security dilemma² arms race with the U.S.  
 
Mildly "good news" 
The third priority for 2005, increasing combat potential, has two major objectives; 
1) weapons modernization and 2) improving the quality of the force.  For the first 
time since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, government spending on 
armaments will exceed Russia¹s weapons exports. (4)  An aggressive re-
armament program gathers steam in 2005, fueled by a 26% increase in budget 
over 2004 as well as another reform that was concluded last year. (5)  In 2005, 
the Russian military will buy armaments through one central agency reporting 
directly to the MOD, compared to 52 different agencies distributed throughout the 
services back in 2001.  This new process aims to reduce corruption by increasing 
transparency and civilian control of the nearly R220bn arms procurement 
enterprise, reduce inefficiencies caused by duplication of effort, and gain 
economies of scale. (6)  
 
 The Russian military plans to add the following weapons to their inventory in 
2005:  four strategic missiles (TOPOL-M mobile version), nine military satellites, 
five booster rockets, three battalions of the new T-90 tanks (17 units), three 
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battalions of the BTR-80 armored personnel carriers (92 units), one battery of the 
Iskander-M tactical missiles (two complexes), two new naval warships, two Tu-
160 supersonic strategic bombers (one new and one refurbished), and seven Su-
27SM modernized fighters and new air-to-ground missiles (nuclear and 
conventional). (7)   Improved long-range conventional airpower, new ground 
launched and air launched missile systems give Russia medium range capability 
with some reasonable degree of accuracy. The new acquisition process and 
increased funding provide expectations that things have bottomed out and will 
begin (perhaps slowly) to improve with regards to revitalizing the capability of 
Russian military hardware. 
 
The bad news – getting worse 
The new armaments being purchased for the Russian military, however, will fall 
to undermanned units made up of low quality troops that are grossly under-
funded and whose lack of training has left them in a poor state of readiness.  The 
quality of the conscripted force is abysmal.  Draft deferments have resulted in 
less than 10% of the draft age population being available actually to be called to 
duty.  This left the military more than 30,000 conscripts short of their 
requirements during the Fall 2004 call up. (8)  With the negative demographic 
and health trends in Russian society, this problem will get worse.  Transition of 
the permanent readiness forces from draftees to contract soldiers has had mixed 
results.  Despite Ivanov¹s claims of success, he knows there isn¹t sufficient 
money to fix the problems of crime, retention, and recruitment that dramatically 
reduce the overall effectiveness of the professional units.  There is a limit to the 
ability of contract soldiers to solve the military¹s personnel problems.  In general, 
the social state of the armed forces continues to worsen.  According to Victor 
Ozerov, Head of the Federation Council Committee for Defense and Security, 
³the current social state of the Russian servicemen poses a threat to stability in 
society and combat readiness of our armed forces.² (9)  Despite all of the talk, 
little has been done to improve the conditions of the average serviceman.  In fact, 
as of the end of 2004, the servicemen were not scheduled to see any pay raises, 
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not even to keep pace with inflation. (10)  There were increases planned in some 
allowances, and a new mortgage savings account program was inaugurated on 1 
January 2005 that created savings account into which the government would put 
money each year for officers and contract servicemen to purchase a house upon 
separation or retirement. (11) This program would not solve the immediate 
problems of housing facing the officers and contract servicemen, but serves as a 
recruitment and retention incentive.  Predictions at the end of 2004 were that if 
the government failed to act, by the end of 2005 nearly 60% of servicemen will 
live below the poverty line. (12) 
 
On the objective of improving the quality of the force, it seems that all forces are 
working against Ivanov.  For 2005, Ivanov¹s plan did not include improving the 
financial condition of the troops.  Knowing that a modern military requires highly 
capable soldiers, Ivanov was more interested in improving the overall quality of 
the persons serving in the military.  So instead of proposals to fix conditions for 
the existing troops, he pursued a different approach.  By removing all 
deferments, especially those for students, the military would be able to call up 
even Russia¹s best and brightest.  With his leadership, the Cabinet approved an 
amendment to the law on conscription removing all deferments on 30 December 
2004. (13)  Ivanov has been threatening to take this politically unpopular step for 
some time, lamenting that: ³We are the world champions in deferments.² (14)  
Knowing that he has already promised to reduce conscription from two years to 
one by 2008 (the next presidential election), and knowing that the conversion to a 
professional force would miss recruiting goals, removing deferments was the only 
way to address an ever decreasing quality of force and ease manning shortages.   
 
Since the first of the year, Ivanov has been able to do nothing but back pedal.  
The economic situation of the troops was made all the worse by the government 
reform of social benefits that came into effect 1 January, replacing government 
provided benefits with monetary compensation.  Although demonstrations 
protesting the implementation of this reform have consisted largely of pensioners, 
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the military, especially the officers, have been hit the hardest by the new reforms.  
Having lost transportation benefits, housing and tax benefits, and others, 
conditions for the servicemen stand to worsen dramatically.  In the wake of 
mounting political pressure brought on by the national demonstrations and other 
forces focused on the plight of servicemen, Ivanov announced a new plan for 
2005.  Now it appears that he supports pay raises for the military to keep pace 
with inflation, and will support the increase in benefit payments for those in high 
cost of living areas by between 120%  to 200%.  ³In general, servicemen¹s pay 
will definitely be raised significantly,² said Ivanov. (15)  The source of this 
additional funding is not clear, but was obviously not part of the plan. 
 
Even worse for Ivanov, he has had to back off his attempt to remove all draft 
deferments.  The bill to remove all deferments never made it to the Duma.  
Instead, Ivanov now claims that he had no intention of sending all students to the 
army, and that there is no definite recipe for elimination of deferments.  He 
promised to study the issue, with the Duma, and revisit it by the end of the year. 
(16)  All indications are that this reversal was based upon the fear that students 
may join the disgruntled pensioners in public protest. (17)  
 
Ivanov has bought himself some time, but no real improvement, in his quality of 
force problems.  The situation will worsen before it gets better, and getting better 
is not yet on the horizon.  As previously noted, without an educated, motivated, 
and well-trained force, the strides being made to modernize the armed forces¹ 
weapon systems will have zero net effect on Russian military capability. 
 
Problem with power 
It appears that Ivanov is gaining a deeper appreciation for the fact that 
consolidation of power is a double-edged sword.  The opportunity he now enjoys 
to generate reform within the armed forces, free from the numerous obstacles 
that have plagued him in years gone by, carries with it direct responsibility for the 
success of his initiatives.  His reforms have succeeded in marginalizing the 
 27 
armed forces¹ generals, giving them fewer resources with which to take care of 
their troops.  As the socio-economic decline of the armed forces progresses, it 
will be far easier for the disgruntled to take aim at Ivanov and his ³boys in short 
pants,² to quote Col-General Skorodumov, than it was previously to take on the 
entire Defense Ministry complex. (18) 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) ³Army Col-General Skorodumov Resigns, Citing Influx of Non-Professionals,² 
Moskovskiy komsomolets, 23 Dec 04; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(2) Russian Defense Ministry Ups Scale of Combat Training – Expert,² Strana.ru 
Web Site, 28 Dec 04; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(3) ³Russian Defence Minister Outlines tasks for 2005,² RIA News Agency, 31 
Dec 2004; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(4) ³Wasteful Arms Spending Under Fire,² by Lyuba Pronina, Moscow Times, 20 
Jan 05, via CDI Russia Weekly. 
(5) ³The Defense and Political Order,² by Vera Kuznetsove and Nikolai Poroskov, 
Moscow Vremya novostey, 30 Dec 2004; FBIS-SOV-2004-1230 via World News 
Connection. 
(6) ³Russian Defense Minister Changes Defense Order Procurement System,² 
RIA-Novosti, 30 Dec 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-1230 via World News Connection. 
(7) ³The Defense and Political Order,² by Vera Kuznetsove and Nikolai Poroskov, 
Moscow Vremya novostey, 30 Dec 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-1230 via World News 
Connection; and ³Hi, Weapons!² Russkii kuryer, 31 Dec 04; WPS Defense and 
Security via Lexis-Nexis. 
(8) ³Ivanov Is Calling,² Gazeta, 10 Jan 05; WPS Defense and Security via Lexis-
Nexis. 
(9) ³Results of the Year: Servicemen Have Become Poorer,² by Igor Plugatarev, 
Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, No.49, 24-30 Dec 04, p.1; WPS Defense and 
Security via ISI Emerging Markets. 
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Security, 29 Nov 04 via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(11) Russian Defense Ministry Ups Scale of Combat Training – Expert,² 
Strana.ru Web Site, 28 Dec 04; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(12) ³Results of the Year: Servicemen Have Become Poorer,² by Igor Plugatarev, 
Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, No.49, 24-30 Dec 04, p.1; WPS Defense and 
Security via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(13) ³Pensioners Frightened Sergey Ivanov,² Russika izvestia, 19 Jan 05; 
Izvestia Press Digest via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(14) ³Ivanov Is Calling,² Gazeta, 10 Jan 05; WPS Defense and Security via Lexis-
Nexis. 
(15) ³Russian Defense Minister Promises Rise in Army Pay in 2005,² Radio 
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Markets. 
(16) Ibid. 
(17) ³Pensioners Frightened Sergey Ivanov,² Russika izvestia, 19 Jan 05; 
Izvestia Press Digest via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(18) ³Army Col-General Skorodumov Resigns, Citing Influx of Non-
Professionals,² Moskovskiy komsomolets, 23 Dec 04; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-
Nexis. 
 
EXTERNAL 
New Russian arms deal for Syria 
On January 12, Kommersant first reported unconfirmed Russian plans to sell a 
number of advanced missile systems to Syria, a U.S. State Department 
designated state sponsor of terrorism. (1)  While reporting has varied, the 
potential sale likely would include 200 shoulder-fired SA-18 Igla (NATO 
designation Grouse) anti-aircraft missiles, eighteen of Russia¹s new and made-
for-export SS-26 Iskander-E missile (NATO Designation Stone), and a small 
number of S-300PMU-2 (NATO designation SA-10 Grumble) air and missile 
 29 
defense systems.  Kommersant cited unnamed sources that claimed Russia was 
planning the major weapons sale to Syria. (2) 
 
Syria has not been able to keep pace with Western, Israeli, or even neighboring 
Arab countries¹ military advances since the collapse of its main military 
supporter, the Soviet Union.  This deal would be Syria's largest arms 
procurement in years, and more importantly, it would mark a generational leap in 
Syria's air defense and all weather strike capabilities. 
 
The weapon systems in question 
The three systems involved in the putative arms deal represent some of Russian 
highest level of military export technology.  The SA-18 Igla is one of the best 
portable surface to air missiles available.  The current missile is not an 
enhancement of a previous design, but an entirely new design.  Its improved 
seeker and enhanced aerodynamic design provide increased range and speed, 
enabling the missile to be used against faster, more maneuverable targets.  The 
missile¹s high effectiveness against countermeasures, specifically electro-optical 
and IRCM jammers that are installed on most military aircraft and Israeli 
commercial aircraft, make it very troubling to some countries and very appealing 
to others. (3) 
 
The short-range, road mobile, ballistic missile system involved in the arms deal is 
the SS-26.  It is a tactical, conventional missile system, originally developed as a 
replacement for the ³Scud B.²  The export version has a significantly shorter 
range than the Russian Military version.  The 280 km range is purposefully short 
of the 300 km (186 miles) export range limit from the Missile Technology Control 
Regime (MTCR).  The SS-26 was designed to fill Russia¹s capability gap in the 
area of air-dropped precision munitions.  It is capable against stationary or 
moving, hard or soft targets.  While marketing the SS-26, Russians have claimed 
that it can evade air-defenses, possibly even the U.S. Patriot interceptors. (4)  
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Even with its reduced export range, the SS-26 potentially would allow Syria to 
strike any part of Israel, including the Dimona nuclear center in the Negev desert. 
 
The S-300PMU-2 (SA-10) system is one of Moscow¹s most exported air and 
missile defense systems.  The current export version, unveiled in 1997, has 
larger missiles with a longer range (200 kilometers), and better guidance system 
than previous S-300 systems. Russia claims that the system has a kill ratio 
between 0.8 and 0.98 against Tomahawk-class cruise missiles and from 0.8 to 
0.93 against aircraft. (5)  The United States¹ extensive use of air power in both 
Gulf Wars and the Global War on Terror campaign in Afghanistan has only 
increased the system¹s market value and desirability, and already significant 
demand has resulted in sales throughout Asia, Europe, and the parts of the 
Middle East. 
 
International concerns and response 
While Syria has some mid and short-range ballistic missiles such as the Soviet-
made Scud-Bs and the North Korean-made Scud-C and Scud-D modifications; 
the Scuds' accuracy can be measured in hundreds or thousands of meters, while 
the Iskander is reported to have an accuracy of several meters.  If the Syrians 
got the Iskander, they could hit sensitive Israeli targets with great precision in any 
weather condition, any time of day or night. 
 
Military analysts consider the Igla to be one of the most sophisticated portable 
missiles and an ideal weapon for militants.  The Igla could be used effectively by 
Hezbollah fighters in south Lebanon against Israeli aircraft or in Iraq against the 
United States.  There are currently thousands of older Russian Igla-1 and Strela 
missiles in the Middle East.  The deployment of this decoy-defeating weapon 
could make a deadly difference in the region. 
 
The positioning of an SA-10 system in southern Syria certainly would have an 
adverse impact on Israeli regional air supremacy.  Additionally, this weapon 
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system's deployment would, at least partially, limit Israel¹s strike capability 
against terrorist training facilities in southern Syria. 
 
On January 2, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon held a secret cabinet meeting 
to discuss intelligence and attempt to develop responses to the possible 
Russian-Syrian arms deal.  The meeting reportedly was attended by Foreign 
Affairs Minister Silvan Shalom, Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz, head of the 
National Security Council Gior Eyland, and the heads of all Israeli special 
services.  After the meeting, negotiations began between Israel and Russia, 
aimed at heading off any deal prior to Syrian President Bashar Assad's visit to 
Russia later this month.  "We had consultations over the past few days, and we 
hope to reach the necessary agreement," AP quoted Israeli Foreign Minister 
Silvan Shalom as saying. (6)  Additionally, Shalom said that the sale of advanced 
missiles to Syria would disrupt regional stability and Moscow should call off the 
deal.  Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Shimon Peres summed up the Israeli 
position, telling reporters, "We have enough problems on the ground with Syria 
and we don't need more problems from the sky." (7) 
 
The European Union's foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, warned that the sale 
could derail the Middle East peace process and could have implications 
throughout the entire region.  "I trust that President Putin will not do anything that 
will go against the stability of the region, which is as much an interest for him as it 
is an interest for us," Solana said. (8) 
 
U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher addressed the issue: "We 
have reports of the sale. The U.S. policy on this is very clear: We're against the 
sale of weaponry to Syria, against the sale of lethal military equipment to Syria, 
which is a state sponsor of terrorism, and we think those kinds of sales are not 
appropriate.   The Russians know about this policy." (9)  Boucher also said 
Washington would consider wide sanctions against Moscow if the reported sale 
went through.  The U.S. State Department has previously sanctioned companies 
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in Russia over arms deals with Syria.  The most recent case was in 1998, when 
Russia agreed to sell Metis-E and Kornet-E anti-tank missile systems to Syria.  
This deal resulted in economic sanctions against the missile system producer, 
the Tula-based Instrument-Building Design Bureau. 
 
Russian diplomatic response 
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov was forced to answer questions about 
the possible arms deal during his official visit to Washington. "We do not have 
any negotiations with Syria on the possible shipment of such missiles," Ivanov 
told reporters at the Russian Embassy in Washington. (10)  Ironically, Defense 
Minister Ivanov was in Washington to discuss ways to stop the spread of portable 
missiles with his U.S. counterpart, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. 
 
The Russian foreign ministries also downplayed the initial media reports and 
denied any strain in the relationship between Russia and Israel.  "In our export 
policy we give special attention to prevention of sensitive arms getting into the 
hands of international terrorists, and the Israeli leadership knows this," Russia's 
Foreign Ministry said in a statement. (11) 
 
One problem with Russian denials is that the current Russian Defense 
acquisition plan includes only two SS-26 mobile launch complexes for the 
Russian army in 2005.  The Votkinsk missile plant most likely requires a higher 
production run to keep the manufacturing line open.  With a limited Russian 
defense budget, the SS-26¹s relatively simple weapons systems, and the 
system¹s small training requirement, it would appear that the entire missile 
complex was designed primarily as an export weapon.  The choice of Iskander, 
the Arabic moniker for Alexander the Great, seems to confirm Russia¹s export 
intentions. 
 
Russia's share of the international arms market 
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Russia experienced a dramatic reduction of arms exports to the Middle East in 
the early 1990s.  This reduction resulted in several countries choosing to replace 
Russian arms with European and American munitions.  The Russian military-
industrial complex certainly would like to regain its once dominant position in the 
Middle East arms market.  
 
The Vice President of the Russian Academy for Geopolitical Problems Vladimir 
Anokhin said, ³The expansion of arms trade with Syria is beneficial for Russia 
and does not violate international norms.² (13)  "We have virtually lost the market 
in the Middle East. The expansion of military-technical cooperation with Syria is 
in fact our comeback to the Middle East market," he said. (14)  He also noted, 
"Talks are under way on the resumption of deliveries of spare parts for weapons 
in Iraq which seems controversial in the present conditions," he said. "Why 
shouldn't we be delivering arms to a stable country such as Syria?" (15) 
 
Russian attempts to recapture some of the Middle Eastern arms trade may be 
more urgent due to the effects of the December 26 tsunami.  Indonesia is set to 
cancel an $890 million jet fighter deal with Russia because the money has been 
diverted to the relief effort.  ³It¹s all about the tsunami basicallyŠ.  It has already 
affected Indonesia¹s previously announced plans to buy Sukhoi planes and 
combat helicopters. It¹s a serious situation for us,² Reuters quoted the official as 
saying. (16)  The total losses to Russian arms sales due to the tsunami could 
reach $1.5 billion. (17) 
 
The diversion of the Middle Eastern arms market in the early 1990¹s left Asia as 
the key market for Russian arms sales.  The cancellation of Indonesia's planned 
purchase will only add to Russian problems; Moscow¹s arms exports in the 
region already suffered a setback with Thailand¹s decision to go with an Anglo-
Swedish consortium over Sukhoi to replace its F-5 fleet.  
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Other problems could be looming on the horizon.  Indonesia has conducted 
apparently free and fair elections and may push for the U.S. and E.U. to lift their 
arms embargoes.  Before the U.S. embargo, Indonesia¹s military imported about 
70 percent of its weapons from the United States. 
 
Russia may be in a similar position with regard to China.  Since 1989 arms 
embargoes, both the United States and members of the European Union have 
continued to engage in military transfers to China.  According to a 1998 General 
Accounting Office report, presidential waivers of the U.S. ban between 1989 and 
1998 resulted in defense transactions to China worth approximately $350 million. 
(18)  France, Italy, and the United Kingdom also have delivered military items to 
China since 1989 and many E.U. members view the embargo as symbolic.  
Russia is currently China¹s leading supplier, providing as much as $2.1 billion 
worth of arms annually.  If European defense companies gain access to China¹s 
market, Russian companies potentially could lose a significant amount of money. 
 
Conclusion 
The arms trade is a competitive business, but unlike most businesses the 
complexity of international politics play a large part.  Russia traditionally chooses 
to sell its weapons where its competitors cannot or will not due to political 
considerations or pressures.  The Russian tolerance for international 
condemnation of its arms sales has been an advantage to Russian arms 
companies and has provided Russian leaders with an international bargaining 
chip.  If the current arms deal with Syria has been approved at the highest levels 
of the Kremlin, it is doubtful that Moscow will heed or cave to U.S. or Israeli 
threats.  Just as in the Iran nuclear power deal, Moscow is not going to give up a 
very lucrative contract or its perceived power due to international pressure.   
 
President Putin certainly has weathered negative international publicity before 
and more bad press is unlikely to back Russia out of the missile deal.  The one 
area where criticism of Putin could have some effect involves his stance on 
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terrorism.  Since the hostage-taking at Beslan, President Putin did his best to 
consolidate his power and highlight the West's alleged double standard on 
terrorism.  Moscow does not identify rogue-states or build lists of countries that 
support international terrorism, so it feels free to sell weapons to almost anyone. 
Weapons proliferation and an apparent lack of concern for the repercussions 
likely will cause Russia major problems, certainly in the long run. Putin's 
insensitivity to fragile relationships within the Middle East could result in Russia's 
loss of stature in brokering a Middle East peace plan.  Russian proliferation may 
result in its removal from the Global War on Terror (GWOT) coalition, or perhaps 
more importantly from the G-8.  No matter how great the financial pressures, 
President Putin should take a long view of this arms deal and its consequences. 
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Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Elena Selyuk 
 
MOLDOVA 
Four main forces for the Parliament 
Parliamentary elections are taking place in Moldova in March. Given that the 
president is elected by the parliament in Moldova, these elections are, in 
principle, parliamentary-presidential. This March vote therefore, will prove 
significant in determining the medium-range prospects for the country. There are 
four main forces in Moldova that have a realistic chance of surpassing the six 
percent threshold and getting into the parliament: (the ruling) Communist Party, 
(centrist) Democratic Moldova voting bloc, (right-wing) Christian Democratic 
Popular Party and the Social Democratic Party. 
 
The choice that Moldovan citizens face this year is much more difficult than four 
years ago, when a former Soviet republic, finding itself on the brink of poverty 
and despair brought on by ten years of uncertain independence, was longing to 
re-experience ³happy Soviet days.² At that time, the Communist Party 
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successfully played on people¹s nostalgic feelings, adding a portion of promises 
about restoring social justice, joining the Russia-Belarusian Union and making 
Russian a state language, which, undoubtedly, appealed to Russian speakers. 
The Communist Party easily managed to obtain power in the country in 2001. 
 
This time around, the choice is more complicated. And while the chances are 
high that the Communists will win the majority of seats in the parliament again, it 
might not be with as significant a margin as four years ago. According to a recent 
Gallup poll, the Communist Party¹s current approval rating is 39%. (1) The drop 
in their popularity is attributed to the dissatisfaction of Russian speaking voters, 
who are unhappy with the Communist¹s change of focus from strengthening 
relations with Russia to taking a pro-Western course. European integration is one 
of the main sections of the party¹s electoral program called ³From Stabilization to 
Modernization.² (2) According to its platform, some of the other issues the 
Communist Party hopes to tackle in the next four years are the creation of 
300,000 new jobs, increasing the average monthly salary from $100 to $300, and 
fighting corruption and bureaucratic red tape. 
 
The current Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin heads the Communist party¹s 
electoral ticket. The speaker of the Parliament, Eugenia Ostapciuc, Prime 
Minister Vasil Tarlev, and other members of Voronin¹s circle, who contributed to 
Moldova¹s relative stability in the past four years round out the party's leadership. 
(3) The party added several young members to their ranks this year, such as 
Marian Lupu and Oleg Reidman, thus demonstrating their appeal to a new 
generation of voters. (4) 
 
The second political organization, which has a good chance of obtaining 
parliamentary seats is the Democratic Moldova voting bloc. Its current popularity 
rating is hovering around 13 percent. (5) The member parties of this opposition 
bloc, Our Moldova Alliance, the Democratic Party and the Social Liberal Party, 
are essentially those parties which were thrown out of the Parliament in 2001 by 
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frustrated voters angered by a decade of failed reforms. The bloc¹s electoral 
program has many similarities to both the Communist Party and the Christian 
Democratic Party programs: taking a pro-European course; increasing average 
salary; and offering broad autonomy to local authorities. 
 
The leader of the bloc – Chisinau Mayor Serafim Urechean – was once thought 
to be a serious candidate for the Moldovan presidency, and his bloc appeared to 
be a real contender to the Communists, but given several strategic errors that he 
has made in the course of the pre-election campaign, his chances are dwindling 
by the minute. He neglected to include representatives of localities into the top 
list of names on the electoral ticket, thus discouraging voters in the provinces 
supporting the bloc, since they refused to accept ³all-Chisinau² representatives 
as their own. Another major error of the leadership was its failure to reach out to 
voters in Gagauzia, where many seemed ready to vote for the bloc, but for the 
inclusion of Mikhail Formuzal, the leader of United Gagauzia movement, in the 
top list of names on the electoral ticket. Finally, Urechean was accused of 
corruption, and could not overcome voter suspicion, which certainly contributed 
to the significant drop in Democratic Moldova's rating. (6) In addition, several 
members have recently left the bloc, one of them being Sergiu Corobceanu, who 
voiced dissatisfaction with the alliance leadership as the main reason for this 
step, thus suggesting a possible split within the bloc. (7) 
 
The third real contender for parliamentary seats is the Christian Democratic 
Popular party, with its leader Iurie Rosca. It is a radical right-wing party, which 
clearly plans to follow the path of the Orange (Ukraine) and Rose (Georgia) 
revolutions if electoral fraud and violations occur. The party adopted orange as 
its election campaign color and is reaching out to people, who would be prepared 
to go out in the streets the day after the elections, if the results appear falsified. 
CDPP¹s rating continues to grow, and the party is already several percentage 
points ahead of the Democratic Moldova voting bloc. Unlike its two main 
competitors, who give general promises such as European integration and salary 
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increases, the CDPP launched a targeted campaign and are appealing to 
specific segments of the populations, such as farmers, private business owners, 
and VAT payers, thus securing a more loyal following. (8) 
 
The final party that has a realistic chance to surpass the parliamentary threshold 
is the Social Democratic Party (PSDM), which currently holds approximately 8% 
of the approval rating. Its election slogan, ³Spring is Coming,² is a symbol of and 
call for change (to the current Communist government). PSDM¹s main objectives 
are to build a law-governed state, support small business and create strategic 
partnerships with both the European Union and Russia. (9) 
 
With the Communist Party leading the polls, it may well win the most seats in 
Parliament. The crucial question for the outcome of these elections is whether 
President Voronin will try to pad the Communist victory in order to control 
parliament, or allow for the presence of a significant opposition. Concerns run 
strong that Voronin might be tempted to assure himself another solid term and 
ensure the stability of Communist control rather than democratic consolidation in 
Moldova. Will he use the "administrative resources" at his disposal to accomplish 
this goal? 
 
BELARUS 
Reorganization within the KGB 
Recently, Lukashenko signed a presidential edict on a KGB reshuffle. Of the 250 
KGB officers currently past retirement age, but who want to extend their service 
with the KGB, only 50 (each hand-picked by the government) were allowed to do 
so. Instead, younger personnel are being encouraged to join the KGB force.  
 
Stepan Suhorenko, whose nickname is ³palach² (³executioner²) in KGB circles, 
has been named head of the Belarusian KGB. ³It was clear right after the 
presidential elections two years ago that Suhorenko will occupy the place of the 
main chekist in the country,² writes Narodnaya Volya. ³Lukashenko definitely 
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liked the percentage of the ³for² votes that he had received from Minsk oblast¹, 
which Suhorenko was supervising.² (10)  Lukashenko commented that the 
reshuffle within the KGB was caused by his dissatisfaction with the work of the 
organization in such areas as intelligence, counterintelligence, fighting organized 
crime and terrorism, and protecting the constitutional order in Belarus. (11) 
 
UKRAINE 
Yushchenko¹s inauguration 
After months of political turmoil in the country and personal health problems, 
Viktor Yushchenko was inaugurated as the third president of Ukraine on 23 
January. ³It is a great honor to address a free people who not only hold Ukrainian 
flags in their hands, but also the fate of their country,² said Yushchenko in his 
national address. ³Today¹s event proves, yet again, that the Ukrainian nation and 
Ukrainian state are real. We managed to conduct fair elections, the transfer of 
power was legitimate – this is a big national victory!²(12) 
 
When the romanticism of the Orange revolution fades, however, Yushchenko will 
be faced with the difficult task of fulfilling the hopes of those who voted for him, 
and at the same time, trying to win the trust of those who have not (especially 
given his latest appointment of Yulia Timoshenko as Prime Minister). 
Yushchenko has significant work to do in uniting the clear divisions that have 
become sharper during the electoral battle. He must also attempt to move 
Ukraine along the path of integration with a reluctant Europe, find compromise 
with those Ukrainian businessmen who supported his opponent, Yanukovich, and 
still contend with serious health issues. 
 
Yushchenko does appear, however, to have something which neither of the two 
previous Ukrainian presidents seemed to have – a sincere, almost idealistic 
desire to serve his country and his people, and to make personal sacrifices for 
the good of the nation. He also has added a strong and determined ally to his 
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team – the new Prime Minister, the so-called ³Princess of the Orange 
Revolution,² Yulia Timoshenko. 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Fabian Adami 
 
Uzbek elections: business as usual.  
Last month, parliamentary elections were held in Uzbekistan. Unlike the polls 
held in neighboring Kazakhstan months earlier, the Uzbek ballot was held without 
any democratic façade or pretense of fairness. Six weeks before the vote was 
due to occur, Uzbekistan¹s major opposition parties, Erk, Birlik, and Ozod 
Dehqonla announced that they planned to boycott the elections. At a press 
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conference held in Tashkent, spokesmen for the parties explained that they were 
taking action in order to draw attention to wide-scale fraud and harassment by 
election officials, as well as the open police intimidation of opposition candidates. 
(1)  As a result of the opposition¹s decision to withdraw from the polls, voters 
were faced with choosing from five pro-presidential parties. Despite this 
advantage, President Islam Karimov nonetheless orchestrated a concerted 
campaign to present a benign, even populist and benign image during the pre-
election period. 
 
First, he announced that in celebration of the 12th anniversary of the creation of 
the country¹s constitution, there would be a broad criminal amnesty, affecting 
some 11.05% of Uzbekistan¹s prison population. The largest demographic 
affected by the amnesty were juveniles (aged 18 or younger at the time of 
conviction), males over the age of 60, and female first offenders. (2) Second, 
Karimov, in his pre-election Parliamentary address, paid considerable lip-service 
to democratic ideals. He insisted that elections would be carried out in a free and 
fair manner and that legitimate criticism from the OSCE and other observers—
who would receive full government cooperation during the process—would not 
be scorned. (3) 
 
The Uzbek elections took place on December 26. According to Central Election 
Commission spokesman Sherzod Kudrathodzhaev, the election was ³open and 
honest,² with voter turnout reaching 85%. (4) Final results released by the CEC 
showed that the Liberal Democratic Party obtained 41 of 120 available seats in 
the legislature, while the People¹s Democratic Party came in second with 33 
seats. (5)  
 
While Kudrathodzhaev¹s assertions regarding the honesty of the elections were 
supported by the CIS Executive Secretary and Chief Observer (as well as former 
Russian Security Council and MUD chief) Vladimir Rushailo, they were flatly 
contradicted by the Head of the OSCE observer mission in Uzbekistan, Lubomir 
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Kopaj, who told the press that Uzbek authorities had ³failed to ensure a 
pluralistic, competitive and transparent election² in line with international norms. 
(6)   
 
President Karimov¹s tone towards Western observers and the OSCE, which was 
conciliatory prior to Election Day soon returned to his more familiar defiant note.  
On 27 January, Karimov stated that the OSCE had little right to pass judgment, 
since Uzbekistan was not truly in Europe, having only joined the OSCE along 
with other Central Asian countries, because ³we were post –Soviet Republics.² 
(7) Addressing the OSCE¹s concerns regarding opposition parties, Karimov 
claimed that they had been discouraged from participating in the election 
because they were not ³serious² (8), and lacked popular support, (9) not because 
they represented a threat to his authority. 
 
In an usual move, Karimov is attempting to justify his political actions and 
motivations to a broader public. In early January, he granted an exclusive 
interview to the Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya gazeta, in which he argued 
that there would be no ³colour² revolution in Uzbekistan. Karimov stated that 
Ukraine¹s revolution had occurred in large part due to two factors: outside 
machinations and funds, and what he termed ³protest potential,² (10) neither of 
which are, according to Karimov, yet present in sufficient quantity to cause 
serious societal changes in Uzbekistan. 
 
There are several possible reasons for this lack of ³protest potential.² The first—if 
the CEC¹s 85% turnout figures are correct, is that Karimov¹s government is 
popular. The second is that the Uzbek public has simply accepted that Karimov¹s 
government cannot be removed, and have resigned themselves to the status 
quo. Third, and most likely, it is possible that ³protest potential² has disappeared 
from broader Uzbek society due to a combination of societal resignation, and the 
repressive nature of the regime. 
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As for the question of Karimov¹s motivation to remain in power, since there is no 
indication of an emerging dynastic succession, unlike in Kazakhstan, it would 
seem that Karimov¹s goal is purely the maintenance of his personal power. 
 
Kyrgyz election update: Keeping it in the family? 
Three months ago, President Askar Akaev gave his annual address to the 
Kyrgyz people. During the speech, Akaev promised that the forthcoming 
elections would be held in complete conformity with the Constitution and 
Elections code. (11) At the time of his speech, Akaev¹s intentions regarding the 
Presidency were unclear—a movement had emerged in southern Kyrgyzstan 
that was agitating for a constitutional amendment, which would allow Akaev 
another term in office. (12) At the same time however, Kygryzstan¹s opposition 
groups were also stepping up their activities, with one group, the Popular 
Patriotic Party collecting signatures for Akaev¹s impeachment. It was clear at the 
time, that opposition groups in the country did not trust Akaev¹s intentions. 
 
Those who cast a wary eye on the President might be prescient: First, although it 
remains unclear whether Akaev himself will stand for re-election later this year, 
both his son and daughter have been nominated to run in the Parliamentary 
elections, scheduled for 27 February. Of the two, Akaev¹s daughter, Bermet 
Akaeva, is the more politically experienced: she is one of the co-founders of 
ŒAlga Kyrgyzstan!¹ (Forward Kyrgyzstan!), a center-right, pro-presidential party, 
and has worked for the United Nations in Geneva, as well as a political 
consultant in Kyrgyzstan. (13) Akaev¹s son is currently serving as President of 
the National Olympic Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic. Secondly, in an event 
apparently directly related to Akaeva¹s candidacy, one of Kyrgyzstan¹s foremost 
opposition leaders has been banned from participating in the elections. Roza 
Otunbaeva currently is the co-leader of one of the country¹s main opposition 
groups, Ata-Jurt, and served as Kyrgyzstan¹s Foreign Minister between 1994 and 
1997. On January 6, Otunbaeva received her registration certificate for February 
elections. Hours later, her registration was revoked by the Central Election 
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Commission, with the official explanation that Otunbaeva was in fact not eligible 
to stand as a candidate. Under Kyrgyz election law, a candidate must be a 
permanent resident of the country for at least five years before being permitted to 
run for office. (14) Otunbaeva has served as Deputy Special Representative of 
the Secretary-General for the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia for the 
last two years, and as such technically does not fulfill the residency 
requirements. Although the same reason was used to refuse registration to 
several other former Kyrgyz diplomats wishing to participate in the election as 
opposition candidates, it has been Otunbaeva¹s exclusion that has caused the 
most controversy. The electoral district in which she planned to run is the same 
district where Akaeva is competing. (15) Naturally this coincidence has led to 
suspicions that Otunbaeva has been excluded to ensure Akaeva¹s election. 
 
The revocation of Otunbaeva¹s registration sparked small opposition protests in 
front of the Parliament in Bishkek, lasting several days. At first, only a few dozen 
people participated in the demonstration, but by January 10, their numbers had 
grown to approximately 200 people. President Akaev was quick to dismiss the 
protestors, describing them as ³home grown instigators² who effectively wished 
to create a revolution similar to that which occurred in Kiev. (16) 
 
President Akaev is not the only senior Kyrgyz politician who has attacked the 
demonstrators. Prime Minister Nikolai Tanayev announced that he had held 
meetings in several cities and towns, designed to ensure that elections were free 
and fair, but Tanayev also issued what could be viewed as a thinly veiled threat 
to demonstrators: on January 11, he announced that a special ³anti-terror 
commission² had been created to monitor events and that a ³group² had been 
brought in by the government to prevent ³all kinds of political developments² and 
ensure ³political stability.² (17) This statement must surely be taken as an 
indication that the Kyrgyz government is prepared to use force to prevent 
revolution if necessary. 
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On January 20, Kyrgyzstan¹s Parliament passed an amendment to the electoral 
law, allowing former diplomats to run for office even if they failed to meet the 
residency requirements. (18) Although the change must still be approved by 
President Akaev, the vote is a sign that events in Georgia and more recently 
Ukraine, have made Kyrgyzstan¹s leaders and legislators increasingly nervous. 
This nervousness may result in a compromise being reached whereby 
Otunbaeva is reinstated in order to stop the protests, but is forced to run in a 
different district, so that Akaeva¹s race is not impeded. 
 
It is difficult to conclude that the concerns of revolution aired by the leadership in 
Kyrgyzstan are justified, or that the situation in the country even vaguely 
resembles that witnessed in Ukraine during the last few months. Public protests 
approaching the scale of those in Kiev have not materialized. Akaeva¹s 
emergence may be an indication that President Akaev is starting to plan for his 
succession. As his daughter is only 32 years of age, it is possible that Akaeva 
seek a third term, and then nominate his daughter as his eventual successor. 
Akaeva, with some claim of political support from these elections would then be 
posed to take the reigns of power whenever her father decides to step down. 
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